China's smile diplomacy

Brad Glosserman (Director of Research at Pacific Forum CSIS)

(Originally appeared in the April 1, 2004 issue of South China Morning Post in Hong Kong and is reproduced here with permission from the publisher)

A battle for the hearts and minds of Asians has begun. While there has been considerable attention on "the rise of China", we are only slowly beginning to appreciate the meaning of that overused phrase. China's economic influence is well apparent. It has become Southeast Asia's leading trade partner as well as that of South Korea. Last year, China accounted for 80 per cent of Japan's export growth. Not surprisingly, there is little talk about "the China threat" any more. Rather, everyone prefers to think of China as an "opportunity": they are right, but there is also an element of whistling past the graveyard. Make no mistake: there is no sidestepping that economic challenge. There is little alternative to accommodation, although governments can try to soften the blow.

The real China challenge flows from the influence that derives from that economic power. I do not worry about military power (at least not for some generations). China needs a peaceful and stable international environment so it can devote its energies to the economic development that will provide the foundation for the resumption of its role as the leading power in the region. Beijing's restrained response to the Taiwanese election is proof that it understands the stakes.

No, the real issue is the more subtle forms of influence that Beijing can now muster. While it is still too early to say that China is accumulating "soft power", Asian governments will try to accommodate Beijing to avoid incurring its displeasure or worse, its wrath. The attempt to leverage bullet train sales to political advantage - to reward France or Germany and punish Japan - is one spectacularly unsubtle exercise of this sort of power, and provides a hint of what lies ahead. But as in the Taiwan case, Beijing's new leaders are smart and shrewd. In other words, do not expect such ham-fistedness to continue. It will get much more subtle.

Actually it already has. As Southeast Asian nations grow increasingly concerned about their economic prospects, Beijing has reached out, offering Asean a special relationship. In recent years, China has agreed on a declaration of a code of conduct for the South China Sea and joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. This "smile diplomacy" has gone a long way to defuse concern about Beijing's long-term intentions.

When US President George W. Bush visited the region last year, he made terrorism his main theme, hammering home the dangers that that regional governments must confront. President Hu Jintao followed Mr Bush throughout that tour, and his message focused on the opportunities that lie ahead. If Mr Bush was darkness, Mr Hu was light. Mr Bush may have been right, but this exercise is about winning hearts and minds. Advantage Mr Hu.

In Northeast Asia, China is proving equally creative. It has taken an unprecedented diplomatic initiative in trying to bring the six-party talks to completion. In so doing, it has won considerable regard in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo. China has worked slowly and capably to win the confidence of all parties and make itself a central player in Northeast Asian diplomacy. That is power.

More alarming for US strategists, China also has a vision for regional relations and - surprise, surprise - it differs considerably from the existing structure. Beijing wants to eliminate the bilateral alliances it considers a holdover from the Cold War era and move to a multilateral security framework based on "mutual trust, mutual benefit, quality and co-ordination". There is already talk of using the six-party talks as the core of a regional security forum.

The idea may be far-fetched, but it is not impossible. Working out and then implementing the details of the "grand bargain" that will "solve" the North Korean nuclear crisis will take years and will require an institutional mechanism. The consultations that will make that possible could brighten the atmosphere that makes a broader security framework a reality.

China has already embraced multilateralism in other regions. Along with Russia, it has been a key mover in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a group that - name notwithstanding - has its headquarters in Beijing.

China is not forcing governments to adopt its vision of regional relations. It is proving remarkably adept at providing a vision and then giving those countries compelling reasons to join. It is a masterful performance and a good indication of what is to come. This competition of ideas in Asia may well be the defining battle of the 21st century.